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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction lies with this court by virtue of Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) pursuant to the order of January 15, 1988 of 
the Utah Supreme Court, pouring over this matter to this court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion 
to set aside judgment in favor of respondent, plaintiff below. 
The judgment ordered against appellant was pursuant to Rule 37 as 
a sanction against appellant for failing to obey a court order 
regarding discovery and related litigation misconduct by 
appellant and his counsel. Furthermore, the Rule 60(b) motion 
which is the subject of this appeal was the second such motion 
filed by appellant and denied by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Were defendant's Rules 55(c) and 60(b) motions to 
set aside timely? 
2. Is the instant appeal from the denial of defendant's 
second motion to set aside barred under the doctrine of res 
judicata due to defendant's failure to appeal the prior denial of 
such a motion? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing 
to set aside defendant's default? 
4. Is defendant's notice of appeal timely? 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C), Rule 55(c), Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules 4(a) and 4(b) of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court determine the outcome of this appeal. Due 
to the length of these provisions, a text of each is set out in 
the Addendum, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff initiated action against defendant Carl F. 
Schettler on April 26, 1985- (R. at 2) In this action plaintiff 
alleged fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of contract in con-
nection with the defendant's submission of a fraudulent claim for 
a stolen vehicle under his policy with plaintiff. (R. at 28-48) 
In response to plaintiff's claim, defendant brought a 
counterclaim based on theories of defamation, bad faith, malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, conversion, negligence and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. (R. at 51-58) 
Defendant's counterclaim sought damages in excess of $700 million. 
(R. 51-58) 
After prolonged litigation, including extensive 
discovery, the trial court eventually dismissed defendant's 
counterclaim against plaintiff on October 31, 1986. The trial 
court certified its order and judgment of dismissal as a final 
judgment under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 
at 722-25) Defendant's appeal from the final order dismissing 
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his counterclaim is a separate appeal pending before the Court of 
Appeals; Case No. 880032-CA. (R. at 771-72) 
Prior to the dismissal of defendant's counterclaim, 
plaintiff submitted various discovery requests calling for produc-
tion of numerous documents, including defendant's personal tax 
returns. These requests were submitted on March 18, 1986 and 
March 27, 1986. (R. at 208-209 and 220-221) 
Due to the defendant's failure to comply with plaintiff's 
request for production of documents, plaintiff moved the court on 
November 6, 1986 to compel production of the requested documents. 
(R. at 745-46) On December 1, 1986, defendant served upon 
plaintiff a few documents pursuant to plaintiff's request for 
production of documents. (R. at 792) Following a hearing on 
plaintiff's motion to compel, the trial court on December 31, 
1986, ordered defendant to comply fully with plaintiff's requests 
for production of documents dated March 18, 1986 and March 27, 
1986, within two weeks. (R. at 803-04) No further response to 
the discovery requests was made by defendant after the trial 
court's order compelling production. 
On January 27, 1987, plaintiff moved for sanctions 
pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for 
defendant's continued failure to produce discovery and failure to 
comply with the court's order of December 31, 1986. (R. at 
808-09) Items of discovery to which defendant failed to respond 
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included personal state and federal tax returns, interrogatories 
which were unanswered, personal and business financial records, 
flooring agreements, correspondence, business reports, copies of 
tape recordings, personal and business net worth statements, 
balance sheets, and other documents as set forth in plaintiff's 
requests. (R. at 816-30) Defendant filed no memoranda or 
affidavits in opposition to the motion for sanctions or to 
justify his failure to comply with the court's order of December 
31, 1986. 
At a hearing on plaintiff's motion for sanctions on 
February 6, 1987, the trial court found defendant to be in 
violation of its order compelling discovery. The court also 
found that defendant offered no justifiable excuse for its 
failure to respond to the discovery in violation of the court's 
order. The court ordered defendant's answer to be stricken and 
his default entered as a sanction pursuant to U.R.C.P. 37(b). 
(R. at 878-79) 
In May, 1987, the court upon consideration of affidavits 
relative to plaintiff's damages, awarded judgment in favor of 
plaintiff. (R. at 1210-11, and 1223-25) Later, the trial court 
based upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause granted 
the defendant an extension of time to file his notice of appeal. 
(R. at 1509-11, and 1546-47) Defendant eventually filed a notice 
of appeal, appealing from the trial court's orders of December 
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31, 1986, February 21, 1987, March 10, 1987, and May 6, 1987. 
(R. at 1579) That appeal is still pending before the Court of 
Appeals in a separate appeal, Case No. 870488-CA. 
On June 3, 1987, defendant moved the trial court 
pursuant to Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to set aside the entry of default and default judgment. 
(R. at 1524-26) Following oral argument on defendant's post-
judgment motion, the trial court on June 24, 1987, denied 
defendant's motion to set aside the entry of default and default 
judgment. Said order was signed and entered by the court on June 
24, 1987. (R. at 1574-75) No appeal was ever brought from the 
trial court's June 24, 1987 order denying defendant's first 
motion to set aside. 
Defendant later filed a second motion to set aside the 
judgment pursuant to Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure on June 29, 1987. (R. at 1587-88) It is from the 
August 17, 1987 order denying defendant's second motion to set 
aside that appeal is now brought. (R. at 1890-91, 1895-96) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT] 
Defendant's motions to set aside were untimely, and 
therefore properly denied by the trial court. Those motions, the 
denial of which is the sole basis of this appeal, related to the 
February 21, 1987 order that entered defendant's default. 
Assuming arguendo that defendant's motions were timely filed, the 
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record clearly demonstrates ample support for the trial court's 
action in refusing to relieve defendant from the default judgment 
entered against him for violating the court's order compelling 
discovery. Defendant has failed to present any evidence in the 
record from which this court can determine whether there has been 
error. When appellant fails to present a record from which an 
appellate court can determine whether there has been error, 
failure to do so results in affirmance. 
Denial of the defendant's second Rule 60(b) motion was 
proper in view that the denial of defendant's first motion to set 
aside was a final judgment, thereby precluding subsequent or 
successive post-judgment motions to set aside. The need for 
finality at the trial court level, requires that the doctrine of 
res judicata bar repetitive, piecemeal motions to set aside. The 
filing of defendant's second 60(b) motion did not toll the time 
in which defendant had to appeal from any of the trial court's 
prior orders. The result is that the notice of appeal in this 
case was not filed within the required 30 days. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE WERE 
UNTIMELY. 
A. Defendant's Rule 55 Motion to Set Aside the Entry of 
Default Was Untimely. 
Rules 55(a) and 55(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure clearly recognize that the entry of default and judgment 
by default is a two-step process. However, once judgment by 
default is entered pursuant to Rule 55(b), the entry of default 
may be set aside only in accordance with the provisions of Rule 
60(b). See Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 926, n. 4 
(Utah 1982); and U.R.C.P. 55(c). 
Defendant's June 3 motion was based upon an allegation 
of "newly discovered evidence." (R. at 1524) Under Rule 60(b), 
a court is empowered to set aside any final judgment, order, or 
proceeding on the ground of newly discovered evidence within 
"three months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken." Defendant's default was entered February 21, 
1986- Defendant's 55(c) motion to set aside the entry of default 
came more than three months after the order striking defendant's 
answer and entering his default. As such, defendant's motion was 
untimely. I 
Even assuming that the three-month limitation period 
found in Rule 60(b) were not applicable to the defendant's June 
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23 Rule 55(c) motion, defendant's motion should still be held to 
be untimely. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments §74 (1982) 
provides: 
[R]elief from a judgment will be denied if: 
(1) The persons seeking relief failed 
to exercise reasonable diligence in disco-
vering the ground for relief, or after such 
discovery was unreasonably dilatory in 
seeking relief. (emphasis added). 
The authors of the Restatement, in commenting on the need for 
promptly notifying a court of the basis for a motion to set 
aside, stated: 
In addition to acting diligently to discover 
the grounds of relief, the applicant must act 
promptly in seeking relief. The requirement 
is cumulative with the requirement that 
application be made within the time permitted 
by applicable statute of rule of court . . . . 
Thus, an application made within such a fixed 
time limit should nevertheless be denied if 
it was not made promptly after discovery of 
the circumstances on which it is based. 
(emphasis added). 
Restatement (Second) of Judgment §74, comment e (1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that a party 
seeking relief from a judgment must establish that it acted with 
due diligence in alerting the court of the grounds for setting 
aside the default. See Wilde v. Wilde, 669 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 
1983); Starzell v. Jaramillo, 663 P.2d 77, 78 (Utah 1983); and 
Airkem Intermountain v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 
(1973) . 
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In American Metals Service Export Co. v. Ahrens Aircraft, 
Inc., 666 F.2d 718 (1st Cir. 1981), the court was faced with a 
similar dilatory request for relief by a party in default. In 
American Metals, when the defendant failed to timely answer the 
plaintiffs' complaint, plaintiffs moved for the entry of default, 
which was entered on June 24, 1980. On August 28, 1980, the 
magistrate entered an order to the effect that the complaint 
would be dismissed if plaintiffs did not move for a default 
judgment. On September 2, 1980, one of the plaintiffs moved for 
a default judgment. A few days later defendant's president 
mailed a letter to the magistrate in response to the plaintiffs' 
complaint. Judgment was entered by the clerk on September 8, 
1980. The judgment was satisfied in November, 1980, under threat 
of attachment. On February 3, 1981, five months after entry of 
judgment, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment. 
In affirming the lower court's refusal to set aside the 
default judgment, the First Circuit noted that the defendant's 
knowing inaction was sufficient grounds to deny his motion to set 
aside: 
We also think that the district court's 
discretion may be guided by the moving par-
ty's "reasonable promptness" or dilatoriness 
in seeking relief . . . . 
In the present case, we see no abuse of 
discretion in the court's weighing heavily 
against defendant its five-month delay in 
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seeking relief, particularly since a 
judgment has been satisfied in the interim. 
This unexcused delay alone is an adequate 
basis for affirming. 
Id. at 720-721. See also, Consolidated Masonry & Fire-proofing, 
Inc. v. Wagman Construction Corp., 383 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1967) 
(court refused to set aside a default due to the party's knowing 
inaction over a two and one-half month period following the entry 
of default); DeRyt v. DeRyt, 6 Ohio St. 2d 31, 215 N.E.2d 698 
(1966) (in an appropriate case latches would be a defense even if 
the complaining party asserted his grounds within the time 
prescribed by the Rules of Procedure). 
Following the trial court's ruling of February 21, 1987, 
defendant was fully aware that the entry of his default was the 
direct result of his failure to produce documents pursuant to the 
trial court's order of December 31, 1986, compelling production. 
Yet, defendant took no action for more than four months to 
correct the ruling he now claims was in error. Defendant did not 
offer any reason or excuse to the trial court for such delay, and 
has not done so on appeal. Under such circumstances the 
defendant's June 29, 1987 motion to set aside should be found 
untimely. 
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B. Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
Was Untimely. 
Defendant's June 29 Rule 60(b) motion to set aside 
judgment is also untimely. Although the motion purported to 
relate to the judgment entered May 6, 1987, the motion in fact 
attacked the order of February 21, 1987, where the trial court 
ordered sanctions pursuant to Rule 37. 
That the June 29 motion relates to the February 21st 
order is shown by defendant's arguments to both the trial court 
and this court. Defendant does not attack the lower court's 
findings awarding $98,579.24 in compensatory damages and $100,000 
in punitive damages. Rather, defendant's motion attacks the 
basis for the order which found sanctions under 37 U.R.C.P. 
appropriate. Specifically, defendant asserts that new evidence 
came to light that shows he should not have been found in 
violation of the December 27, 1986 order compelling discovery. 
The "new evidence" consists of affidavits and deposition 
testimony. (See Addendum to Appellant's I?rief) The evidence 
proffered by defendant, even if constituting "new evidence", goes 
to the basis for the February 21, 1987 order striking defendant's 
answer, not the May 6, 1987 judgment which merely set the amount 
of damages. 
Rule 60(b) was clearly available to defendant to seek 
relief from the February 21, 1987 order striking defendant's 
answer and entering his default. U.R.C.P. 60 provides in part: 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
* * * 
(b) . . . On motion and upon such terms as 
are just, the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party . . . from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (emphasis added) 
The entire thrust of defendant's argument under his 
60(b) motion goes to the order which found him in violation of 
the order compelling discovery. Defendant's contention is with 
the February 21st order, not the May 6th judgment. Since Rule 
60(b) clearly can be used to set aside such orders, it must be 
brought within "a reasonable time." Where a motion to set aside 
is premised on "newly discovered evidence", the motion must be 
brought within three months after entry of the order. The order 
which defendant attacks was entered on February 21, 1987. The 
motion giving rise to this appeal was filed on June 29, 1987, 
more than four months later. The motion was untimely presented to 
the trial court. As such, the court committed no error in 
denying defendant's second Motion to Set Aside. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT'S FILING OF SUCCESSIVE POST-
JUDGMENT MOTIONS IS BARRED UNDER THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
The instant appeal is brought from the order denying 
defendant's second motion to set aside. The first motion to set 
aside, dated June 3, 1987, was denied by the trial court on June 
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24, 1987. (R. at 1524-25, and 1574-75) No appeal has been filed 
by defendant from that order. On June 29, 1987, rather than 
appealing, defendant filed a second motion to set aside the 
judgment. (R. at 1587-88) It is from the August 17, 1987 order 
denying defendant's second motion to set aside that this appeal 
is brought. (R. at 1890-91, and 1895-96) 
The Maine Supreme Court in Willette v. Umhoeffer, 268 
A.2d 617 (Maine 1970), faced a situation similar to that 
presented here. In Willette, the defendant failed to timely 
answer the plaintiff's complaint. The defendant then brought a 
60(b) motion, which was granted and the default set aside. 
Plaintiff appealed, and the Maine Supreme Court reversed the 
lower court's ruling on the post-judgment motion. The defendant 
then filed a new motion to set aside the default judgment, which 
was granted. The plaintiff appealed, contending that the 
defendant was barred from bringing successive motions under Rule 
60(b). 
On appeal the Maine court agreed that a judgment cannot 
be set aside on the basis of repetitive Rule 60(b) motions. The 
court held: 
We are here dealing with a judgment, not 
appealed from, which must be accorded finality 
under well-established rules unless relief 
therefrom is afforded properly and season-
ably for any one of the reasons set forth in 
M.R.C.P., Rule 60(b). We are further dealing 
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with the effect of a final decision on one 
60(b) motion as it relates to the right to 
pursue the attack on the judgment further 
by means of successive 60(b) motions. The 
principles underlying the doctrine of res 
judicata have full applica-tion in such a 
situation. 
* * * 
It is encumbent upon the defendant to 
bring to the attention of the Court on his 
first motion those issues bearing directly 
upon his right to relief from judgment. He 
could not reserve a portion of his alleged 
grounds in order to lay the basis for sue-
cessive motions seeking the same relief. 
. . . . Although res judicata is ordinarily 
applied to second independent actions 
between the same parties . . . the prin-
ciples upon which the doctrine rests have 
equal application to successive attacks upon 
a judgment . . . where all of the issues 
were or could have been litigated on the 
first motion. (emphasis added) 
Id. at 618-619 (emphasis added). 
A similar result was reached in Calhoun v. Greening, 
636 P.2d 69 (Alaska 1981). In Calhoun, the defendant sought to 
set aside a default judgment obtained against him. Defendant's 
first Rule 60(b) motion was denied, and was not appealed. In a 
subsequent proceeding, defendant's second motion for post-judgment 
relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) was also denied, and defendant 
appealed. 
Relying on the doctrine of res judicata, the Alaska 
Supreme Court determined that the denial of defendant's first 
Rule 60(b) motion was res judicata as to subsequent motions on 
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those issues which were raised or could have been raised in the 
initial motion. The Alaska court stated: 
[Defendant's] instant motion is his second 
attempt to have the judgment against him set 
aside. We believe that this motion consti-
tutes a "subsequent action . . . upon the 
same claim or demand . . -" 
* * * 
[Defendant's] second contention is that 
his second motion raises issues not 
addressed by his first. [The first] motion 
simply asserted denial of due process, while 
this motion claims a violation of Civil Rule 
55(c). However, a fundamental tenant of the 
res judicata doctrine is that it precludes 
relitigation between the same parties not 
only claims that were raised in the initial 
proceeding, but also of those relevant 
claims that could have been raised then. 
[Defenant] had a full opportunity to present 
his Rule 55(c) argument as part of his ini-
tial motion; his failure to raise it then 
precludes him from raising it now. 
Id. at 72 (emphasis added). 
The Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the policy 
considerations underlying application of the doctrine of res 
judicata to successive post-judgment motions to set aside in 
Sears v. Sears, 85 111.2d 253, 422 N.E.2d 610 (1981). In Sears, 
the court held that a second post-judgment motion was not 
authorized, and explained: 
Permitting successive post-judgment motions 
would tend to prolong the life of a lawsuit 
-- at a time when the efficient administra-
tion of justice demands a reduction in the 
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number of cases pending in the trial court 
-- and would then itself to harassment. 
There must be finality, a time when the case 
in the trial court is really over and the 
loser must appeal or give up. Successive 
post-judgment motions interfere with that 
policy. And justice is not served by per-
mitting the losing party to string out his 
attack on a judgment over a period of 
months, one argument at a time, or to make 
the first motion a rehearsal for the real 
thing the next month. In the interest of 
finality, and of certainty and ease of 
administration in determining when the time 
for appeal begins to run, we reaffirm the 
rule of Deckard that successive post-
judgment motions are impermissible . . . . 
Sears, 422 N.E.2d at 612-613. See also, Reeves v. Hutson, 144 
Cal.2d 445, 301 P.2d 264 (1956); Federal Lumber Co. v. Hanley, 515 
P.2d 480 (Colo.Ct.App. 1973); Wright v. Fidelity Finance Co., 474 
P.2d 232 (Colo.Ct.App. 1970); Palmer v. Jackson, 188 Ga. 336, 4 
S.E.2d 28 (1939); Perkins v. Salem, 249 So.2d 466 (Fla.App. 1971); 
Doslind v. Doslind, 678 P.2d 1093 (Hawaii Ct.App. 1984); Taber v. 
Taber, 516 P.2d 987 (Kan. 1973); and Royal Coachman Color Guard v. 
Marine Trading & Transportation, Inc., 398 A.2d 382 (Maine 1979). 
The Utah Supreme Court's pronouncement in Mendenhall v. 
Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287 (Utah 1980), suggests that the doctrine 
of res judicata should apply to successive post-judgment motions 
under Utah law. In Mendenhall, the plaintiffs brought an 
independent action pursuant to Rule 60(b) to set aside a 
foreclosure judgment and the subsequent sale of certain 
residential property to the defendant. Defendant moved for 
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summary judgment on the basis that the denial of a prior motion 
to vacate the judgment was res judicata as to the plaintiffs in 
the present case. The trial court granted the defendant's 
motion, and plaintiffs appealed. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the denial of a 60(b) 
motion to set aside a judgment is res judicata to a subsequent 
independent action to set aside that judgment. Id. at 1289. The 
court's holding in Mendenhall that a party may not pursue one 
post-judgment remedy to final adjudication and then pursue 
another remedy, is analogous to the instant appeal. 
The trial court's order of June 24, 1987, denying 
defendant's First Motion to Set Aside, was a final appealable 
order. Denial of the first motion barred further consideration 
of subsequent post-judgment motion by the trial court under 
either Rule 55(c) or Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Defendant's remedy did not lie in further repetitious 
and piecemeal motions to set aside. Defendant's remedy was to 
seek appellate review of the denial of his first motion. The 
trial court did not, therefore, err in denvinq defendant's June 
29 motion to set aside. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
Trial courts are given considerable latitude of 
discretion in ruling on motions to set aside default judgments. 
See Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Utah 1987); Katz 
v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986); Larsen v. Collina, 684 
P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984); and Board of Education v. Cox, 14 Utah 
2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, 807 (1963). Since an application to set 
aside a default judgment is equitable in nature, the trial court 
is in the best position to determine the attendant facts and 
circumstances'. Cox, 384 P. 2d at 808. Absent a patent abuse of 
discretion, an appellate court should not disturb the trial 
court's ruling on a motion to set aside, id. at 807; Katz, 732 
P.2d at 93. Although some ground may exist to set aside a 
default judgment, does not require the conclusion that the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to do so when the 
attendant facts and circumstances support such a refusal. Katz, 
732 P.2d at 93. 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides in part: 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(2) Sanctions by court on which action 
is pending. If a party . . . fails 
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to obey an order to provide or 
permit discovery 4 . . the court in 
which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the 
failure as are just, and among 
others the following: 
* * * 
(C) An order striking out pleadings 
or parts thereof . . . or 
rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party 
In a civil case, the general rule is that a party who 
refuses to respond to an order compelling discovery is subject to 
the full range of sanctions available under Rule 37(b)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. First Federal Savings and Loan v. 
Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984). Speaking of the 
purposes of sanctions pursuant to Rule 37, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated: 
[SJanctions are intended to deter misconduct 
in connection with discovery and require a 
showing of "willfulness, bad faith, or fault" 
on the part of the non-complying party. The 
choice of an appropriate discovery sanction 
is primarily the responsibility of the trial 
judge and will not be reversed absent an 
abuse of discretion. 
An exception to the general rule exists when 
a privilege is validly asserted. A court may 
not ordinarily strike a party's pleadings if 
the refusal to respond to a discovery order 
is based on a valid claim of privilege. 
Striking the pleadings is permissible, however, 
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where there is an invalid refusal to obey a 
discovery order. 
First Federal Savings and Loan, 684 P.2d at 1266 (emphasis added). 
In addition, unless an aggrieved party can demonstrate 
that the trial court's action in entering sanctions pursuant to 
U.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(C) is without support in the record, it should 
not be disturbed on appeal. Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 
Utah 2d 97, 296 P.2d 410, 412 (1964). 
Plaintiff submits that defendant's failure to cite to 
any specific portion of the record on appeal should be construed 
as an admission that the judgment of the lower court, striking 
his answer and entering his default, was correct. See Fackrell, 
740 P.2d at 1319; Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987); 
and State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982). Plaintiff 
respectfully submits that the defendant failed to cite to the 
record because there is no support in the record for the position 
he took before the trial court, nor for the position he now takes 
before this court. In fact, the record gives ample support to 
sustain the actions of the trial court in striking defendant's 
answer and entering his default for willful and inexcusable 
refusal to abide by the court's order compelling discovery. 
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A. The Trial Court Committed No Error in Finding That Relief 
From the Final Judgment Under Rule 60(b) Was Not Available 
to Defendant. 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs 
relief of final judgment. The only basis claimed by defendant on 
appeal for relief from the judgment in the instant case is the 
alleged discovery of "new evidence." Under Rule 60(b)(2), a 
party may be relieved from a final judgment where new evidence is 
introduced "which by due diligence could not have been discovered 
in time to move for new trial under Rule 59(b)." 
In Doty v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 P.2d 993 (Utah 
1982), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the requisite elements 
for a 60(b) motion based on newly-discovered evidence: 
(a) There is material, competent evidence 
which is in fact newly discovered; 
(b) By due diligence the evidence could not 
have been discovered and produced at 
trial; and 
(c) The evidence must not be merely cumu-
lative or incidental but must be of 
sufficient substance that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that with it there 
would have been a different result. 
Id. at 995. 
Defendant's proposed "new evidence" consists of the 
deposition and affidavit of defendant's accountant, and the 
affidavits of Sam Vong, Janet Reid, and Wayne Schoenfeld. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the affidavits and deposition 
testimony offered by defendant as "new evidence," fails under 
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the test outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in Doty. 
The affidavits and deposition testimony offered by 
defendant in support of his motion to set aside at the trial 
level are not material. Entry of judgment against defendant was 
not based upon any evidence now sought to be controverted by 
defendants "new evidence." Defendant's default judgment was 
entered as a result of his unjustified failure to comply with a 
court order compelling discovery. The affidavits and deposition 
testimony do not even remotely pertain to the basis for the trial 
court's action in striking defendant's answer and entering his 
default. 
1. Affidavits of Sam Vong and Janet Reid. 
The affidavits of Sam Vong and Janet Reid clearly could 
have been obtained by defendant, and defendant alone, any time 
prior to the trial court imposing sanctions under Rule 37. 
Evidence that the Utah State Tax Commission and the Internal 
Revenue Service do not have any records of tax filings by the 
defendant from 1977 to the present surely must have been 
available to defendant, upon due diligence, at the time of the 
hearing on defendant's motion to compel on November 14, 1986, 
nearly eight months prior to defendant's June 29 motion to set 
aside. At the very least, such evidence was available at the 
February 8, 1987, hearing on plaintiff's motion for sanctions. 
Defendant has failed to show that the affidavits of Sam Vong and 
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Janet Reid were unavailable at the time of the trial court struck 
his answer and entered his default. 
Once again, it is important to recall that the personal 
tax records of defendant were but a small portion of the entire 
request for production of documents made by plaintiff. Having 
failed to establish that the evidence of the non-existence of tax 
records was undiscoverable, defendant has failed to meet even the 
most preliminary analysis required under the Utah Supreme Courtfs 
holding in Doty. 
2. Affidavit of Wayne Schoenfeld. 
The affidavit of Wayne Schoenfeld likewise fails to 
measure up to the standard pronounced in Doty. Under Utah law, 
an affidavit must set forth facts that will be admissible in 
evidence. U.R.C.P. 56(e); and Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 
859 (Utah 1983). The Utah Rules of Evidence require that a 
witness testify only to matters within his or her personal 
knowledge. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 602. An affidavit based 
on unsubstantiated opinions or beliefs is insufficient. 
Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). 
The purported affidavit of Mr. Schoenfeld states that 
the affiant believed that defendant, Carl Schettler, had no 
knowledge of the whereabouts of his automobile. This belief, 
however, is not within the affiant's personal knowledge but 
merely reflects his unsubstantiated opinion. As a result, the 
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"new evidence" provided by the affidavit does not conform to the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, and is not competent evidence. 
Additionally, the Schoenfeld affidavit contains hearsay. 
Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, hearsay "is a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801. Schoenfeldfs 
affidavit includes statements made by Detective Mortensen of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office to the affiant during the 
defendant's trial. Since these statements were not made by the 
declarant, Wayne Schoenfeld, while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, they are hearsay and as such are inadmissible as 
evidence. 
The purported affidavit is also incompetent since it 
directly contradicts Mr. Schoenfeld's prior sworn testimony. 
Evidence that would tend to merely contradict a witness' prior 
testimony has been held insufficient to grant a new trial, even 
though made by the defendant himself. See Ghyselinck v. Buchanan, 
13 Ariz. App. 125, 474 P.2d 844 (1970); and Aiken v. Protis, 59 
Ariz. 101, 123 P.2d 169 (1942). 
The Utah Supreme Court has considered the competency of 
a contradictory affidavit where the affiant has given prior sworn 
testimony. In Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983), the 
plaintiff offered his affidavit to avoid summary judgment. The 
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affidavit was contrary to his prior deposition testimony on the 
same issue• The Supreme Court held that the affidavit could not 
be used to defeat summary judgment where his deposition testimony 
on direct and cross-examination supported summary judgment. The 
Utah court in so ruling acknowledged the inherent reliability of 
deposition testimony over affidavits: 
As a matter of general evidence law, a 
deposition is generally a more reliable 
means of ascertaining the truth than an 
affidavit, since the deponent is subject 
to cross-examination and an affiant is 
not. . . . But when a party takes a clear 
position in a deposition, that is not 
modified on cross-examination, he may not 
thereafter raise an issue of fact by his 
own affidavit which contradicts his deposi-
tion, unless he can provide an explanation 
of the discrepancy. 
Id. at 1172. 
Schoenfeld's affidavit contradicts his deposition. (See 
R. at 1562-63, and Deposition of Wayne Schoenfeld, pp. 39-40, R. 
at 1174) He has not provided an explanation for this discrepancy. 
This contradictory evidence, in addition to being irrelevant, was 
insufficient for the trial court to set aside defendant's default 
judgment. 
The affidavit of Schoenfeld likewise fails under the 
Doty test since defendant cannot show that by due diligence the 
evidence could not have been discovered and produced prior to the 
time for the hearing on plaintiff's motiojji for sanctions. For 
that matter, the defendant's own affidavit, offered in support of 
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the June 20 motion, demonstrates that the "new evidence" had been 
available for a considerable time prior to the hearing on the 
motion. In fact, defendant has had three opportunities to 
discover the same evidence. Defendant had the opportunity to 
cross-examine Mr. Schoenfeld during the defendant's preliminary 
criminal hearing, at the subsequent criminal trial, and later at 
Mr. Schoenfeldfs deposition in the instant case. As this "new 
evidence" was not discovered during the course of this 
litigation, due diligence has not been shown. 
Assuming arguendo that the affidavit of Wayne Schoenfeld 
contains "new evidence," it is clear that the evidence is of 
insufficient substance to create a reasonable likelihood that the 
defendant's default judgment would not have been entered. As 
previously stated, the judgment in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendant was granted pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The fact that affiant Schoenfeld has 
subsequently contradicted previous sworn testimony has nothing to 
do with the entry of defendant's default judgment. Thus, this 
new evidence is incidental and does not present a reasonable 
likelihood that with it there would have been a different result. 
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3. Deposition Testimony of John Wilkins. 
Defendant also claims that the deposition testimony of 
John Wilkins, the defendant's accountant, constitutes sufficient 
"new evidence" to warrant setting aside his default judgment. 
Defendant's reliance on Mr. Wilkins1 testimony as a basis for 
claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing 
to set aside his judgment is unfounded. Mr. Wilkins testified in 
his deposition that he did not participate in the preparation of 
any of the defendant's personal income tax returns. The fact 
that Mr. Wilkins did not assist the defendant in preparing his 
personal income tax returns does not necessarily mean or imply 
that the defendant did not file any tax returns. Nor does the 
deposition of Mr. Wilkins establish any reason or excuse for 
defendant failing to supply other documents sought in discovery 
by plaintiff. As a result, the deposition testimony of John 
Wilkins is immaterial and of insufficient substance to create a 
reasonable likelihood that with such evidence there would have 
been a different result at the trial level. 
B. There Was Ample Basis for the Trial Court Striking 
Defendant's Answer and Entering His Default. 
Defendant hopes to restrict the court's review of the 
facts that led the trial court to impose sanctions. He argues 
that the only basis for the sanction was his failure to produce 
personal tax returns. However, the scope of defendant's disregard 
for discovery rules and violation of the trial court's express 
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orders is much broader. The trial court's order of December 31, 
1986 stated: 
Furthermore, with a denial of defendant's 
motion for summary judgment plaintiff's 
motion to compel production of documents is 
granted, defendant having two weeks from the 
date hereof to fully and completely respond 
to plaintiff's request for documents dated 
March 18 and March 27 of 1986. (emphasis 
added) 
(R. 803-4) 
It is undisputed that defendant did nothing further to 
provide discovery subsequent to the court's order of December 31, 
1986. No further documents were provided, no further answers to 
interrogatories were given and no affidavits were filed explaining 
the reasons, if any, why discovery could not be provided. In 
effect, there was a total disregard of the court's order. 
As a result of defendant's blatant disregard for the 
trial court's order, sanctions were deemed appropriate pursuant to 
Rule 37(b). This conduct alone would have warranted the court's 
sanctions. However, at that point in the proceedings the trial 
court had before it a history of repeated discovery abuse and 
misconduct of the most outrageous nature by defendant and his 
counsel. 
This conduct by defendant and his counsel were the 
subject of an earlier motion for sanctions which was heard in 
August, 1986. (See R. 340-341 and as more particularly detailed 
in the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, R. 360-382) 
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Particular instances of misconduct during litigation included: 
1. A threat by defendant Carl Schettler against 
witnesses Ruel Ware and Dorothy Ware during their depositions of 
February 13, 1986. (See Affidavit of Court Reporter, Lynne L. 
Schinderling, R. 462-5) 
2. Mr. Wayne Schoenfeld, former manager of Pioneer 
Dodge, Inc., testified that three or four weeks before his 
deposition he was approached by defendant's attorney, Mr. Edward 
Flint, who misrepresented himself as counsel for an insurance 
company. (See Deposition of Wayne Schoenfeld, pp. 102-3, R. 1174) 
3. Before the scheduled depositions of Mr. and Mrs. 
Steven Smith in Tampa, Florida, defendant's counsel spoke by 
phone with Mr. and Mrs. Smith and told them that if they consented 
to give their deposition in Florida, he would subpoena them and 
they would be compelled to come to Utah to appear at the trial. 
As a result of these intimidating misrepresentations as to 
subpoena power, the Smiths initially declined to give their 
depositions. (See Depositions of Jill Smith, pp. 29-33, R. 1148; 
see also Deposition of Steve Smith, p. 33-35; R. 1149) 
4. Finally, and most egregious, there was testimony from 
an independent witness, Mr. Troy Murdock, that in April, 1986, 
shortly before he was to give a deposition in this matter, he was 
picked up by defendant and his attorney and two other large 
gentlemen, taken to a notary and coerced into signing a false 
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affidavit. The witness also testified that he was offered $1,000 
by defendant in exchange for not appearing for his deposition. 
(See Transcript of Hearing before Judge Dean Conder on April 14, 
1986, R. 1677-1701; and Deposition of Troy Murdock, R. 1161) 
As a result of the misconduct of defendant and his 
counsel, plaintiff brought an earlier motion to strike pleadings 
as an appropriate sanction. That motion was still under 
consideration by the trial court at the time of its ruling on 
plaintiff's second motion for sanctions in February, 1987. (R. 
722-5) Hence, the trial court had before it serious and repeated 
attempts by defendant and his counsel to impede justice, suppress 
evidence and fabricate false testimony through improper influence 
of witnesses. Given this entire history which defendant 
carefully avoids in his brief, it is understandable and 
commendable that the trial court would impose the most severe 
sanctions authorized by Rule 37(b). 
In W. W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, 
Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
default as a sanction is appropriate where the failure to respond 
to discovery impedes the trial or frustrates the purposes of 
justice and the determination of the validity of a defendant's 
claims: 
The sanction of default is justified where 
there has been a frustration of the judicial 
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process, viz, where the failure to respond 
to discovery impedes trial on the merits and 
makes them possible to ascertain whether the 
allegations of the answer have any factual 
merit. Id. at 738. 
In the present case defendant's misconduct is far more 
serious than that of the defendant in W. W. & W. B. Gardner. Even 
disregarding defendant's attempt to coerce, intimidate and bribe 
witnesses, he was in direct violation of the court's express order 
of December 31, 1986. In W. W. & w. B. Gardner, the defendant was 
not in violation of such an order, yet the Supreme Court approved 
default as a sanction. Clearly the attempts by defendant to 
frustrate the civil trial process were severe. The record will 
also reflect the trial was approximately one month away at the 
time of the hearing on the motion for sanations. (R. 801) 
Fortunately, the courts of this state have seldom had to 
deal with the type of litigation misconductt as involved in the 
present action. However, in a prior case also involving 
litigation misconduct by a defendant, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 
1985), noted the importance of parties to a lawsuit complying 
with the trial court's orders regarding discovery: 
Were this court to allow such flagrant 
disregard for properly constituted orders of 
the lower courts, any defendant could avoid 
his obligations simply by becoming 
incommunicado. Id. at 1112« 
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Although the court in Synergetics was dealing with the 
defendant's repeated absence from the jurisdiction to avoid his 
deposition, the principle it announced applies equally in the 
present case. In Synergetics, as in the present case, the trial 
court imposed the sanction of defaulting a defendant for the 
flagrant, inexcusable, and unjustifiable violation of an express 
court order. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL IS UNTIMELY. 
Defendant's notice of appeal purports to apply only to 
the August 17, 1987 order denying defendant's June 29, 1987 
motion to set aside. As shown in Point II, supra, successive 
motions to set aside are unauthorized. Denial of one Rule 60(b) 
motion bars further Rule 60(b) motions under the doctrine of res 
judicata. When defendant's first motion to set aside was denied, 
his sole remedy was to appeal from that order. Defendant never 
filed an appeal from the June 24, 1987 order denying his original 
motion to set aside. Defendant chose instead to file a 
subsequent motion to set aside. 
While defendant suggests that the trial court granted 
him leave to file a second motion to set aside, he fails to point 
to any support in the record for such leave. Indeed, the record 
on appeal demonstrates that no such leave was ever granted. The 
June 24, 1987 order denying the original motion clearly does not 
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provide any support for defendant's allegation that he was 
granted leave to file his June 29, 1987 motion to set aside. 
Now on appeal, defendant contends that his June 29 
motion stayed the time in which to appeal the denial of the first 
motion to set aside. The Utah Supreme Coijrt in Fackrell v. 
Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987) clearly rejected the 
proposition urged by defendant that the second motion to set aside 
tolls the running of his time to appeal. In Fackrell, the trial 
court entered a child support order on April 14, 1983, requiring 
the father to pay child support in accordance with the prior 
decree of the court. On May 6, 198 3, the defendant father filed 
a motion to reconsider. The motion was denied, and defendant 
thereafter filed his notice of appeal. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court questioned the 
timeliness of the notice of appeal filed by the defendant. The 
defendant contended that his motion based jupon Rule 59 and Rule 
60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure extended the time in 
which he could file an appeal from the court's prior final order. 
The court noted that if the motion was treated as one under Rule 
59, the motion was untimely since it was not filed within 10 days 
of the April 14, 1983 final judgment. In addition, the court 
indicated that even under Rule 60, the defendant's notice of 
appeal was untimely: 
Treating a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) or 
(7) likewise does not save ifhis appeal and 
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prevents us from reaching the merits of the 
trial court's original order. The Rule 60(b) 
motion does not extend or toll the 30-day 
period in which appeals in the original 
action must be filed. See R. Utah S. Ct. 4(b). 
We therefore cannot consider the father's 
attack on the order refusing to modify child 
support and decide only the issue of whether 
it was error for the district court judge to 
have rejected father's motion. 
Id. at 1319 (emphasis added). 
Defendant's sole remedy following the June 24 order 
denying his original motion to set aside was to file a notice of 
appeal within thirty days, as required by Rule 4(a) of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court. Defendant failed to file any appeal 
from the June 24 order. He elected instead to file another Rule 
60(b) motion. On appeal, defendant asserts that the second 
motion tolled the time he had to appeal the earlier denial. Rule 
4(b) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and the decision in 
Fackrell reject such a conclusion. Defendant had only until 
July 27, 1987 to appeal the denial of his motion to set aside. 
The instant appeal was not filed until September 14, 1987. 
Defendant's appeal must therefore be dismissed as untimely. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant appeal, arising from the August 17, 1987 
order denying defendant's second motion to set aside, is without 
merit. The June 29, 1987 motion was untimely. In addition, 
successive motions to set aside are not permitted. Defendant's 
failure to appeal from the denial of the first motion to set 
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aside bars the instant appeal under the doctrine of res judicata. 
Since defendant's second motion was improper, there can be no 
abuse of discretion in denying such a motion. Finally, defendant's 
second motion to set aside did not toll the time in which he 
could appeal from the trial court's earlier denial of defendant's 
first motion to set aside. 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff respectfully 
submits that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's 
June 29 motion to set aside. The trial court's order should, 
therefore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^ day of January, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM 
Determinative Authorities < Al 
November 6, 1986 Motion to Compel J A4 
December 31, 1986 Order A6 
January 26, 1987 Motion for Sanctions A8 
February 21, 1987 Order j A10 
June 3, 1987 Motion and Notice for Relief 
from Judgment and to Set Aside Judgment A12 
June 24, 1987 Order A15 
June 29, 1987 Motion and Notice to Set Aside 
Entry of Default and Default Judgment A17 
August 17, 1987 Order A19 
September 14, 1987 Notice of Appeal A21 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 37(b)(2)(C) 
(b) Failure to comply with order 
* * * 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is 
pending. If a party or an officer, director, or 
managing agent of a party or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf 
of a party fails to obey an order to provide or 
permit discovery, including an order made under 
Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a 
party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 
26(f), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are 
just, and among others the following: 
* * * 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or 
parts thereof, staying further proceedings 
until the order is obeyed, dismissing the 
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or 
rendering a judgment by default against the 
disobedient party; 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 55(c) 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause 
shown the court may set aside an entry of default 
and, if a judgment by default has been entered, 
may likewise set it aside in accordance with 
Rule 60(b). 
-Al-
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 60(b) 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, 
for any cause, the summons JLn an action has not 
been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is biised has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not 
limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside 
a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any'relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
-A2-
RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT, RULE 4(a) and RULE 4(b) 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a 
matter of right from the district court to the 
Supreme Court, the notice of appeal required 
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
district court within 30 days after the date 
of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from; provided however, when a judgment or 
order is entered in a statutory forcible entry 
or unlawful detainer action, the notice of 
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with 
the clerk of the district court within 10 
days after the date of entry of the judgment 
or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a 
timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is filed in the district court by 
any party: (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); 
(2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration 
of the judgment would be required if the motion 
is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend 
the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new 
trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall 
run from the entry of the order denying a new 
trial or granting or denying any other such 
motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the 
district court by any party: (1) under Rule 24 
for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an 
order, after judgment, affecting the substantial 
rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the 
order denying a new trial or granting or denying 
any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed 
before the disposition of any of the above motions 
shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must 
be filed within the prescribed time measured from 
the entry of the order of the district court 
disposing of the motion as provided above. 
-A3-
LMED 
S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314 
MARK J. TAYLOR, 44 55 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
H.f. 
LJOLEW 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, 
Defendant. 
• MOTION TO COMPEL 
Ci^il No.: C85-2687 
1 Judge Richard Moffat 
Plaintiff, AMICA Mutual Insurance Company, by and through 
its attorneys of record, hereby moves the above-entitled court 
for an order compelling defendant to produce documents as requested 
in plaintiff's request for production of documents dated March 
18, 1986 and March 27, 1986. In particular, said requested 
documents include defendant's personal state and federal income 
tax returns and personal networth statements, financial state-
ments and loan applications. Plaintiff submits said documents 
are material and relevant as establishing defendant's income and 
assets in issue because of the claim for punitive damages. 
DATED this £ ^ day of November, 19 86. 
A4 uO' 0 tffcS 
S. BAIRD MORGAN' ~J 
Attorneys for/piaijvtif f 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion to Compel was hand-delivered this \D day of November, 
1986, to the following: 
Phil Hansen 
Attorney for Defendant 
#800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/^  
^uO^ G 
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S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314 
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
CALR F . SCHETTLER, . 
D e f e n d a n t . 
> ORt>ER 
I C i v i l N o . : 
Vj; \ -mu 
C 8 5 - 2 6 8 7 
LL> 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion 
to compel discovery having come before the above-entitled court, 
the honorable Richard H. Moffat, District Court Judge presiding 
and oral arguments on said motions having been heard on November 
14, 1986 and S. Baird Morgan and Mark J. faylor of Strong & Hanni, 
attorneys for plaintiff being present and Edward J. Flint, attorney 
representing defendant being present and the court having heard 
arguments and having granted parties additional time to submit 
further legal briefs on the issues and said supplemental briefs 
having been filed and reviewed by the court and the court being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now therefore; 
FILED IN CLfiAK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
JAN 5 1987 
H Dixon Hindloy Clerk. 3rd Chst Court 
By K ( ^rT^ah 
t^oi'ty&ierk 
A6 
^00503 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's 
motion for summary judgment is hereby denied. Furthermore, with 
denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment plaintiff's 
motion to compel production of documents is granted, defendant 
having two weeks from the date hereof to fully and completely 
respond to plaintiff's request for documents dated March 18, 
and March 27 of 1986. 
Each side to bear^its respec^/ve costs herein, 
.986, 
 i   e a r i t  r ti  t  erei . 
DATED this 3 / day ot^(j//^lm^L^^ , 1! 
ATTEST 
BY THE COURTS ^
 H D | X Q N H | N D L E Y 
/ CLERK 
By—^LC^S^^_ 
B
^
fX\ ^S ''/JJW deputy Clerk 
/klChi&D H/#^FFAT 
District Cp)Art Judge 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
„IJ-N 
Order was mailed by first-class mail, postage prepaid, this Z> 
day of Oi2>^Qrx^Qo^ / 1986, to the following: 
Phil Hansen 
#800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant 
L JQ ,U2A^ (V\n iHrrL ng 
-2- ^ 
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S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314 
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
JAN 28 iOcs^'3] 
^QMiau Jfiaihiu 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL. F. SCHETTLER, 
Defendant. 
MOTIO^ I FOR SANCTIONS 
Civil No. C85-2687 
Judge Richard Moffat 
Plaintiff, Arnica Mutual Insurance Company, by and 
through counsel of record, hereby moves this court, pursuant to 
Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for sanctions 
against defendant, Carl F. Schettler, for failure to comply with 
this court's order dated December 31, 1986. In particular, 
plaintiff moves this court to strike defendant's answer and enter 
judgment in favor of plaintiff as prayed for in plaintiff's 
complaint. This motion is supported by the attached memorandum 
of points and authorities. 
A4 -1-
A8 uOOS° ,8 
Dated this £Cr - day of , 1987. 
Attorneys f 
V. 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this A. / day of 
/M^/l/^i^s, ' 1987
 f a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
^ 
Motion for Sanctions was hand delivered to: 
Phil L. Hansen 
Edward L. Flint 
Attorneys for Defendant 
800 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mff<nr 
A4 - 2 -
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>G&0-^ 
S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314 
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Sail Lake City Utah 
FEB 2 3 1987 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. l 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, . 
Defendant, 
1 >^RDER 
, Civi,l No. : C85-2687 
, Judg e Richard H. Moffat 
Plaintiff's motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure having come for hearing before 
the above-entitled court on the sixth day of February, 1987, pursuant 
to written notice and the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, District 
Court Judge presiding and plaintiff being I represented by S. Baird 
! 
Morgan and Mark J. Taylor of Strong & Hanni, attorneys and defendant 
being present in person and represented by Phil L. Hanson, attorney 
and the court having reviewed the memoranda and pleadings of record 
including the court's prior order of December 31, 1986 ordering 
defendant to completely and fully produce documents including his 
State and Federal income tax returns for the years 1977 through 
the present and such other financial records and documents as request 
*-j 
A10 . 0 0 ^ 
in plaintiff's request for production of documents of March 18 and 
27, 1986 and said documents not having been produced and no justifiable 
excuse being offered by defendant for failure to produce said document: 
and the court having heard oral argument of counsel and being otherwise 
fully advised in the premises, now therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that plaintiff's 
motion to strike defendant's answer and enter defendant's default 
is hereby granted. The clerk of the court is hereby directed to 
forthwith enter defendant's default in the above-referenced matter. 
The present trial setting of March 10, 1987 is preserved but the 
issues at trial shall be limited to the amount of damages to be 
awarded plaintiff herein/ 
DATED this ^K / day ot^TJ^ , 1987. 
ATTEST 
H £>iXON HINDLE> 
CLERK 
deputy Cieri 
^FAT 
District Co/j/Jt Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND^-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Order was hand-delivered this day of , 1987, 
to the following: 
Mr. Phil Hansen 
Mr. Edward Flint 
#800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-2-
All 
Fllj! ,E0 IH CLEM'S OFFICE 
PHIL L. HANSEN (1343) 
Attorney for Defendant 
800 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2467 
JU|N 
H 
i| 4 5UPH *lll 
2 l p C U ^ 
.P IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH NDXl G$ 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, 
Defendant. 
MOTION AND NOTICE FOR 
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
AND TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT 
CiVil No. C 85-2687 t1 
Defendant, Carl F. Schettlerf by and through his counsel 
of record, and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60 (b) of the 
Utan Rules of Civil Procedure does herewith move this court for 
relief from the judgment entered in the above-entitled matter on 
May 6, 1987, and to set the default judgment aside on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under the 
provisions of Rule 59 (fy). 
DATED t h i s y ^ ^ y of V , 1987. 
PHI1TL. HANSEN 
Attorney fcir Defendant 
GO i > 
A12 
-2-
NOTICE 
TO THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF AND ITS COUNSEL: 
You, and all of youf will take notice that the Defendant's 
Motion and Notice for Relief from Judgment and to Set Aside 
Judgment will come on for trial on the \y&- day of Ti,wr 
,1987 at the hour of Q\fio fuw, before Judge |\\r\ fCe^-h 
in the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. n 
DATED this ^5>^aay of C l ° ^ - ^ 1987. 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
C,0 
A13 
>(VVS' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MOTION AND NOTICE FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND 
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, this <IJ&- day of June, 
1987, to: 
S. Baird Morgan 
Mark J. Taylor 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
• \ 
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S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314 
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, 
Defendant. 
i ORDER 
i Civil No.: C85-2687 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Defendant's motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59, U.R.C.P. 
and motion to set aside judgment of May 6, 1987 pursuant to Rule 
60(b), U.R.C.P, having come before the above-entitled court for 
hearing on the 12th day of June, 1987, and plaintiff being repre-
sented by S. Baird Morgan of Strong & Hanni and defendant being 
represented by Phil L. Hansen, and the court having heard arguments 
of counsel and considering the memoranda on file in this case, 
including two affidavits of Wayne Arthur Schoenfeld dated May 20, 
19 87 and June 11, 1987, now therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that defendant's 
motion for a new trial is denied, and that defendant's motion to 
set aside judgment entered May 6, 1987, is denied. 
115 
!HR! 9A 1987 
~ > 1 v/^Sd/^lQ^S!^^ 
DATED this 3f day of 1987. ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Order was hand-delivered this day of June, 1987, to the following 
Phil L. Hansen 
#800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
A16 
FILED !N CLERKS RFFiCE 
Salt 1 aka C-.w Utah 
PHIL L. HANSEN (1343) 
Attorney for Defendant 
800 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Sa l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2467 
JUL 9 1987 
H D:xcn HincJ'oy, Cl>*k 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
- v -
CARL F. SCHETTLER, 
Defendant. 
MOTION AND NOTICE TO SET 
ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT 
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-85-2687 
Judge Richard A. Moffat 
Defendant, by and through h i s counsel of r ecord , 
moves the court for an o rde r , pursuant to Rule 55 (c ) , Rule 60(b) 
and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of C iv i l Procedure, to se t a s ide 
the defau l t en te red on May 6, 1987. The de fau l t should be s e t 
a s ide because the test imony of defendant ' s accountan t , John 
Wilk ins , taken in a depos i t ion by p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel on 
February 11, 1987, c o n s t i t u t e s new evidence and good cause 
t h a t j u s t i f i e s r e l i e f from the o p e r a t i o n of t he judgment. In 
a d d i t i o n , p l a i n t i f f ' s motion for sanc t ions was made without 
reasonable inqui ry and for an improper purpose i n v i o l a t i o n of 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure* 
The reasons se t for th for t h i s motion are s e t fo r th 
in the a t t ached memorandum and a f f i d a v i t s as f i l e d h e r e i n , 
A17 
and on the pleadings, papers, records, and files in this 
action. 
DATED this ^ft^-day of June, 1987 
u* 
- ^ 
ILL. HANSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Entry of Default and Default Judgment will come on for 
hearing on the 31st day of July, 1987, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., 
in the courtroom of the Honorable Richard A. Moffat, Third 
District Court Judge, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
DATED this ^V^kf^of. June, 1987. 
PHIL il. HANSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify thaT a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by hand-delivery, this $)0 day of June, 
1987, on the following: 
S. Baird Morgan, Esq 
Mark J. Taylor, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
LA jry\%M.tr* A )(k u /n s^C r\ i inm *-wrv( £A 
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S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314 
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, 4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
Plaintiff, j 
vs. 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, . 
Defendant. 
1 ORDER 
Civil No.: C85-2687 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Defendant's motion to set aside judgment dated June 29, 1987 
having come before the above-entitled court, the Honorable Richard 
H. Moffat, District Court Judge presiding and defendant being present 
in person and represented by attorney Phil Hansen, esq. and plaintiff 
AMICA Mutual Insurance Company being represented by S. Baird Morgan 
and Stephen J. Trayner of Strong & Hanni and said parties having 
submitted their memoranda and affidavits with regard to said motion 
and the court having reviewed said memoranda, affidavits and all 
pleadings of record and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, 
now therfore; 
AUG 1 7 »987 
A19 mo 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's 
motion be and the same is hereby denied. 
DATED this /*7 day of (V^—<^£^1^ , 1987, l  A
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
T
 ATTEST 
C o u t t Sft&ft HINDLEY 
•3y f#3#y Cfao&p1 
* V Deputy Cle'rk 
I HEREBY CERTIFY t h a t a t r ue and c o r r e c t copy of the foregoing 
Order was hand-del ivered t h i s | ^ day of vX-ieu t--A~ > 1987, 
to the fol lowing: 
Phil L. Hansen 
#800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
( j Q / «Dv^ \M\af 
^ ^ T 
A20 A?/ 
PHIL L. HANSEN (1343) 
Attorney for Defendant 
800 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Sa l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2467 
H. D.'ACN 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
CARL F. SCHETTLER, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. C 85-2687 
Judge Richard Moffat 
Notice is hereby given that Carl F. Schettler, the 
above-named defendant, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah from the Order denying defendant's motion to 
set aside judgment signed by the Honorable Richard Moffat and 
entered by the clerk of the above-entitled court on August 17, 
1987. 
DATED thi i»iU LC day of September, 1987. 
'^A^l^kiM~^' 
Attorney for Defendant 
800 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
A21 IM5 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Notice 
of Appeal was served this day of September, 1987, on 
S. Baird Morgan and Mark J. Taylor of STRONG & HANNI, attorneys 
for plaintiff, Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
Hfti/fMa 
- 2 -
A22 /t'U 
